The paper studies the equilibrium value of bid-ask spreads and timeto-trade in a continuous-time, intermediated …nancial market. The endogenous spreads are the price at which brokers are willing to o¤er immediacy. They include physical trading costs. Traders intervene optimally, when the portfolio mix reaches endogenously determined barriers. Spreads and times between successive trades are increasing with the di¤erence in agents risk attitudes. They react asymmetrically to an increase in the di¤erence of risk aversions, while they are symmetric in trading costs. We detect a bias towards cash. Optimal trade is drastically reduced when costs increase, so as to preserve the investors welfare. Random switches to a competitive market, to be interpreted as outside options, drastically reduce bid-ask fees.
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The way in which trading costs a¤ect equilibrium asset prices in the competitive case, as well as the way in which they interact with the price for immediacy in the intermediated case, is not easy to assess. The reason is that costs go hand in hand with infrequent trade, as opposite to the standard continuous trading of frictionless models.
Decentralized models with symmetric information have successfully addressed general equilibrium asset pricing and trade frequency in the presence of trading costs, both when investors have the same risk aversion (Vayanos (1998) , Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) ), and when they do not (Buss and Dumas (2012) ). They have investigated the e¤ect of trading costs on prices and turnover. Since trading is competitive, agents simply share exogenous trading costs. The sharing rule is endogenous. In Vayanos' overlapping-generation model, costs have a small e¤ect on prices, while the trading frequency is dramatically reduced with respect to a frictionless situation. Investors can refrain from trade even for decades. Lo et al. point at a more signi…cant e¤ect of costs on equilibrium prices. Buss and Dumas go even further. They use the assessed e¤ect on prices to produce a cost-adjusted CAPM and to explain some empirical asset pricing puzzles. In terms of trade, the last two papers get smaller times to next trade, since investors have a so-called high-frequency motive to trade, given by an in…nite-variation ‡uctuation in dividends.
Recent models of centralized trading instead provide endogenous bid-ask spreads but explain it through asymmetric information. These models have concentrated mostly on a speci…c source of costs, namely search costs, when there is the possibility of trading both in a decentralized and centralized way (Du¢ e, Pedersen (2005, 2007) ).
This paper aims at …lling a gap in the literature, by focusing on centralized trading with symmetric information. It aims at explaining both the level of endogenous spreads and the amount of endogenous, infrequent trading in general equilibrium. Our starting point is the case in which there are no physical trading costs, but still the intermediary deserves a fee for the service of immediacy. We study …rst a situation in which investors must trade through the intermediary, then a situation in which they have the "outside option" of waiting and trade at no cost in a decentralized market. This permits to understand how much equilibrium bid-ask spread, but also trade frequency, are a¤ected by exogenous components, such as physical costs, and competition. Up to the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst model which endogenizes bid-ask spreads with symmetric information. With respect to decentralized trade, we can split the impact of exogenous trading costs and intermediary services on spreads.
The paper is expected to enhance the comprehension of the price for intermediation and trade impact of strategic brokers behavior. It aims at doing so with respect to the partial equilibrium models of investor's behavior in the presence of transaction costs, such as Constantinides (1986) -which take those costs as exogenous -and with respect to the traditional microstructure literature, as exempli…ed by the seminal models in intermediaries' pricing, such as Stoll (1978) , Ho and Stoll (1981) -which takes the frequency of trade as exogenous.
In order to study equilibrium bid-ask spreads we go back to the simplest framework for investors'choices in continuous-time stochastic economies, characterized by a risky and a riskless asset, together with in…nitely lived, power utility agents. We assume that a representative investor faces a single broker, or specialist, who sets the spreads. We verify that the equilibrium conditions have no solution if the bid-ask spread is null, unless the investor is risk neutral. We show numerically that, if the risk aversion of the agents is diverse, with brokers less risk averse than investors, an equilibrium exists. Spreads and the time to next trade are increasing in the di¤erence in risk aversion, while welfare loss for the investor is not. Bid and ask prices are very sensitive to risk-aversion di¤erences: the impact of the …rst on the second is one order of magnitude bigger. Also, spreads do not react symmetrically to discrepancies in risk attitudes and generate a bias towards cash. We present our model and results …rst for the case in which there are no trading costs, then in the presence of trading costs. Opposite to di¤erences in risk aversion, trading costs generate symmetric e¤ects on bid-ask prices and barriers. Last but not least, we extend to the case in which investors can choose either to trade with the specialist at his bid-ask fee or to wait until another investor, with whom they can trade at no cost, submits an order to the market. The second situation, in which investors have an outside-option driven by a regime-switch, provides much smaller fees, as expected. The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 sets up the model without trading costs. Section 2 studies the optimization conditions for the two types of agents (investors and specialist). Section 3 de…nes equilibrium and studies its features. Section 4 rules out the existence of equilibrium in which spreads vanish. Section 5 provides numerical examples of equilibrium and studies spreads, trading policy, transaction frequency, welfare implications, as well as their sensitivity to the specialist's risk aversion, in comparison to partial equilibrium models. Section 6 covers the case in which exogenous trading costs exist too.. Section 7 studies the outside-option case and its implication for equilibrium spreads and trade. Section 8 summarizes and outlines further research.
Model set up
This section speci…es the objective of the agents, the admissible transaction costs and admissible dynamics of traded assets. We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy in which two assets are traded: a riskless and a risky one. The interest rate r on the riskless asset is not determined endogenously. The pre-bid, pre-ask price of the risky asset -its fundamental value, which describes its dividends -is a geometric Brownian motion with parameters and . Two agents populate our economy: a representative investor and a specialist.
The investor maximizes the expected utility of his terminal wealth, EU (W (T )). He has an in…nite-horizon power utility, U (W ) = W = . Unless otherwise speci…ed, we assume that he his risk averse and non-myopic: < 1; 6 = 0. His objective is lim
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The admissible transaction costs are proportional to the value of trade. For each dollar value of risky security he trades, the investor receives a bid price s and pays an ask price 1=q, which will be constrained to be respectively smaller and greater than -or at most equal to -one: s; q (0; 1]. We will call the di¤erences 1 s; 1=q 1 the transaction costs, in order to distinguish them from the actual trading costs, which impinge on the broker only and will be introduced in section 6 only. The proportionality constants s and q will be determined in equilibrium as a function of all the exogenous variables. Since we will search for a stationary equilibrium, s and q will be constant over time.
The investor takes as given the transaction costs, as well as the risk-return features of the risky asset. Let x(t) and y(t) be the (fundamental) values of his riskless and risky position 2 . His …nal wealth is their liquidation value, i.e.
The (partial equilibrium) investor's optimization problem has been solved by Dumas and Luciano (1991) for the case of non-in…nitesimal spreads and by Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011) for the case of in…nitesimal spreads. It is shown in both papers that -if z is the standard Brownian motion which drives y -there exist two increasing processes L and U which make the value of the investor's assets evolve according to
The processes L and U increase only when : = y=x; the ratio of risky to riskless asset in portfolio, reaches respectively a lower and an upper barrier, which we denote as l and u. Their changes are the local time of the stochastic process at the lower and upper barrier. As a consequence, there is no exact notion of "trade size", since the adjustment does not occur in discrete amounts.
In most of what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict our formulas to parameter combinations which make both barriers positive 3 , i.e. 0 < l < u. To this end, we restrict the parameters so that the optimal asset holdings would be positive in the absence of transaction costs:
We know that asset holdings with bid-ask spreads include the optimal holdings in the corresponding frictionless market, l < < u, where the optimal ratio is the standard Merton's one:
With trading frictions, the ratio is not kept at , but the high trading frequency needs imposed by the in…nite variation of the underlying fundamental price y remains.
The specialist pays to the investor the returns on the risky asset 5 and stands ready to absorb all the transactions required by the investor. He charges a bid and an ask price for this, i.e. he sets s and q. Both the risky and riskless asset are in zero net supply, so that demand equals supply by de…nition (this will be useful in equilibrium). If x s and y s are the specialist's asset holdings, this implies x s = x, y s = y and the ratio s = y s =x s is the opposite of the consumer one, namely s = . The specialist is a power-utility agent which aims at maximizing the expected utility U s of his …nal wealth, when the horizon becomes in…nite:
If not speci…ed otherwise, we also assume that he is risk-averse, 1 0 > 0. For the time being we assume that he does not incur trading costs. This means that the dynamics of his assets is
while his …nal wealth is W s = x s + y s = x y.
Optimization
This section brie ‡y reviews the optimality problem of the investor and introduces ex novo the optimality conditions of the specialist. We search for a stationary solution to both problems.
Optimization for the investor
The optimization problem of the investor is well understood in the literature. Indeed, it is known that, with positive risk aversion, problem (1) under (2) reduces to solving for the function I the ODE
5 In this sense, the risky asset can be interpreted as in Buss and Dumas (2012) : it entitles the investor to receive his risky endowment. 6 We rule out constraints on his wealth. In particular, we rule out the possibility of default of the intermediary.
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-with 2 R -under the value-matching and smooth-pasting BCs, namely 8 > > > < > > > :
where we have used the shortcut notation
" u :
The function I provides us with the value function of the problem,
if there exists a constant -an arti…cial discount rate -which makes K itself, once discounted, …nite and stationary. Formally, we need such that J(x; y; t; T ) = e (T t) K(x; y; t; T )
J(x; y; t; T ) = J(x; y) and, given the homotheticity of the utility function, we assume J(x; y) = x I ( ). It has also been shown that a solution technique for the above problem consists of three steps. The steps -which are described in Appendix A -turn the investor's problem into an algebraic equation in the unknown . Having de…ned m :
and
the algebraic equation is
where -using si and co to denote the trigonometric sines and cosines 7 -the 7 There is also a case where the sines and cosines have to be interpreted as hyperbolic ones, and slight di¤erences in signs occur. The type of solution depends on whether, having de…ned c.
we have > (<) c: (see Appendix A).
expressions for a; b; c; d are
The solutions for which are acceptable are the ones which make " l and " u real.
For the case of negative (positive) , a straightforward computation shows that this is the case as long as ( ) , where
2.2 Optimization for the specialist
The specialist aims at maximizing his utility from …nal wealth, and we let his horizon diverge, while searching for a stationary solution. However, his instruments are not the trading barriers l and u, but the trading costs s and q. The specialist's problem is subject to the standard value-matching conditions, when the processes L and U are di¤erent from zero. The FOCs with respect to l and u which provide the smooth-pasting conditions for the investor though must be substituted by optimality conditions with respect to s and q. It can be shown that the value function cannot -and need not -be maximized with respect to s; q on the whole domain, but at most for speci…c choices of . The natural choices are = l and = u, since trade occurs at those levels only. Using the traditional approach to smooth pasting, we set the derivatives of the value function equal to zero with respect to s and q at = l and = u. Let K s be the specialist's value function, i.e.
It is easy to show, as in the investor's case, that, if we aim at a stationary value function, we must discount K s at a rate 0 : = r 0 0 . We can de…ne the discounted value function J s (x s ; y s ; t; T ) = e 0 (T t) K s (x s ; y s ; t; T ) and assume that it has a stationary limit:
We end up with the following di¤erential equation for I s :
whose solution is of the type
The value-matching conditions impose continuity of the value function at the trading points. Indeed, the investor chooses a trading policy which requires his counterpart to trade so as to stay at the boundary of the trading region too. We have:
where the " are the ones de…ned above (and decided by the investor). As in the investor's case, these value matching conditions imply that the constant
where
In order to take the derivatives of the value function with respect to the specialist's choice variables, recognize that the bid price s applies at the upper barrier u only, while the ask price 1=q applies at the lower barrier l only. As a consequence, the derivatives to be equated to zero are with respect to q at l and with respect to s at u. In taking these derivatives, the broker considers the investor's reaction to his choice of the spreads.
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The optimality conditions of the broker are obtained from (17), di¤erentiat-ing with respect to q and s, i.e. computing 8 > > < > > :
8 Here too we report the trigonometric case only. In the investor's case the equation for incorporated both the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition, since the " were determined as in Appendix A. The equation for 0 incorporates the value-matching conditions only, since the " come from the investors'problem.
9 It can be demonstrated that an equilibrium in which dealers do not take the reaction of their counterpart into consideration does not exist. The reaction is evaluated in terms of barriers, not in terms of traded quantities, since we know that the investor trades so as to stay along the barriers of the no-transaction cone. The only investor's reaction is in terms of the level, or barrier, not in terms of quantity of intervention, or amount of trade. which gives the "modi…ed" smooth-pasting conditions 8 > > < > > :
In the last system we have the derivatives of the boundaries with respect to the costs, @l @q ; @u @s ; which must be obtained from the investor's problem solution. Appendix B shows that, if we compute appropriately these derivatives and substitute for (17) and (19) into the ODE, we get the following algebraic equations, which synthesize the value-matching and "modi…ed"smooth-pasting conditions for the specialist:
where @l @q and @u @s are given in Appendix B.
Equilibrium
This section de…nes an equilibrium for the previous economy and comments on the properties of its prices and quantities. An equilibrium in the previous market is a quadruple ; 0 ; s; q , with s; q 2 (0; 1] 2 , such that the investor's maximization problem is solved the specialist's one is solved too and the barriers l and u are real:
Since, by de…nition, the specialist absorbs any trading need of the investor, we do not need to worry about matching demand and supply of the risky and riskless asset. No market clearing condition is needed, since we are working with a state variable, the investor risky to riskless ratio = y=x, which is equal to the opposite of the corresponding ratio for the specialist s = y s =x s : Market clearing is embedded into the choice of the state variable. Overall, an equilibrium requires that the four algebraic equations (11), (18), (20), (21) -which we report here for the sake of convenience -be solved at the same time 10 with s; q 2 (0; 1] 2 ; ( ) if < (>)0.
1 0 For given r; 2 ; ; 0 ; the investors' problem is solved once is found, while the specialist's one is solved once 0 ; s; q are.
Equilibrium prices, quantities and trade are as follows.
Prices
The procedure we follow consists in verifying that the pre bid, pre-ask geometric Brownian motion 11 price speci…ed above is indeed a fundamental value. 12 We know from He and Leland (1993) that it is the equilibrium asset process for the corresponding economy without intermediaries and transaction costs. In an intermediated market, investors sell at a constant discount on it, as commanded by the bid price s, and buy at a surcharge on it, given by the ask price 1=q. The fundamental value is never observed as a trading price, while sy and y=q are. They can be observed only when trade occurs, though. There are two di¤erent trading prices. When trade occurs because the investor reaches his upper barrier, and needs to sell the risky asset, the cum-bid price sy is the observed trading price; when trade occurs at the lower investor's barrier, the cum-ask price y=q is the observed trading price. Both prices are reduced (substantially reduced, as we will see in numerical examples) because of transaction costs s and q, even in the absence of trading costs. This is in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . The ensuing bid-ask spread (per unit value of the underlying) 1=q s is going to represent the equilibrium price of immediacy.
In the traditional microstructure literature the bid and ask prices usually depend on the level of inventories. This happens in our case too, since the barriers l and u represent the agents' inventories, and the equilibrium conditions from which s and q are determined involve l and u. Both prices are still decreasing with inventories 13 .
Quantities
It is known that L and U are the local times of the process y=x at l; u respectively: trade per unit of time is in…nitesimal, with in…nite total and …nite quadratic variation. In this sense, there is no "order size" in the traditional sense of the microstructure literature. However, knowing that the portfolio ratio stays between the barriers and using the properties of local times of regulated Brownian motion, the moments of trade can be computed. The price and quantity features just listed are consistent with the …ndings in Buss and Dumas (2012) for a competitive market. Despite the fact that their bid-ask spread is exogenous and time is discrete, since their endowment evolves as a binomial tree, and our risky asset's fundamental value evolves as Brownian motion, in both cases transaction prices and trades have in…nite total and …nite quadratic variation.
Trade frequency
The trading policy behind our equilibrium is such that observed trade is not continuous in time, but infrequent. The frequency of trade will depend on the distance between the barriers l and u. The closer the barriers, the more frequent trade will be.
It is clear from the equilibrium conditions that spreads and trade will depend on the risk aversion of market participants. It is quite intuitive that an equilibrium will exist if the broker is less risk averse than the investor. Pagano and Roell (1989) already proved that brokers trade only with customers more risk averse than themselves.
14 Before investigating this -as well as the spread and trade dependence on the di¤erence in risk aversion between market participants -in the next section we show that the spread can be zero if and only if the specialist is never requested to participate in the market. In turn, we know from optimality conditions without bid-ask spreads that this occurs if the investor is risk-neutral. not trade. We can verify that this is correct for risk-neutral investors, since we know that -without transaction costs -the no-trade barriers collapse to the optimal Merton's holding, ; and that for risk-neutral investors this holding is -1.
We aim at proving that the system (22) admits no solution when s = q = 1; and consequently l = u = , unless = 1. The proof is as follows. With s = q = 1 or no costs, the …rst two equilibrium conditions in (22) do not determine the rates ; 0 any more. At = =
+r the rates of growth are instead the usual
The last two equilibrium equations in (22), once evaluated at
(1 ) 2 +r r @u @s j u= ;s=q=1
They can be solved at the same time if and only if the ratio of the barrier's sensitivity to costs is equal to the optimal riskless to risky holding: @u @s j u= ;s=q=1 @l @q j l= ;s=q=1
It is easy to show that the previous equality -under mild technical conditions on the derivatives of a; b; c; d -is satis…ed if and only if ! 1, i.e. the investor is risk neutral. We indeed know that in this case is optimal investment allocation ! 1, and he does not need an intermediary to optimally balance his wealth. This shows that risk-neutral investors -who do not trade -may be granted zero bid-ask spreads, as intuition would command.
Examples
The equilibrium conditions provided above cannot be solved explicitly. We discuss them starting from a base-case, which is calibrated to the pioneering literature in single investor's optimality with transaction costs (Constantinides (1986) ). We expect the spreads to be quite bigger than the observed ones, since we have homogenous investors and no outside-option. We are also ready to obtain a frequency of trade low with respect to actual market frequencies, since, on top of the presence of two agents only, in order to keep the model tractable, we disregard some important motives to trade, such as speculative reasons arising from asymmetric information or hedging motives due to incompleteness of the market (also without transaction costs). In this respect, the results of the basecase should be interpreted as those of Buss and Dumas (2012) or Lo et al. (2004) : there is no attempt to calibrate a speci…c market.
In section 5.1 we obtain the equilibrium quadruple in the base-case and discuss the resulting bid-ask spread, transaction policy, expected time to next trade and rate of growth of derived utility, in comparison with their partial equilibrium (or investor-only) values. In section 5.2 we discuss the impact of the di¤erence in risk aversions on the results.
Base case
Starting from the fundamental risk-return base-case in Constantinides (1986) , i.e. r = 5%; 2 = 4%, we assume a coe¢ cient of risk aversion for the investor equal to 1 = 4, and a broker's risk aversion slightly smaller: 1 0 = 3:85. This section shows -among other things -that spreads are one order of magnitude bigger than the (percentage) di¤erence in risk aversion which justi…es them, but expected times to next trade are lower than in the corresponding partial equilibrium models. These models were by de…nition unable to capture the e¤ect of risk-aversion heterogeneity among market participants. By so doing, they overestimated trade inertia, for a given level of costs. The result we obtain reconciles low heterogeneity in risk aversion -which seems to be an empirically relevant phenomenon, see for instance Xiouros and Zapatero (2010) and references therein -with reasonable levels of trade frequency. These are close to weeks or months, not to years or decades as in similarly-calibrated partialequilibrium models; the no-trade region presents a bias toward cash. This bias does not depend on consumption-on-the way. It just depends on the bigger sensitivity of ask prices with respect to risk-aversion di¤erence. This could help in explaining the equity-premium puzzle.
The investor-broker equilibrium is indeed characterized by the quadruple 15 ; 0 ; s; q = (0:023428; 0:023687; 97:53%; 68:41%);
with barriers equal to l = 0:301825 < < u = 0:480013:
since the corresponding no-cost problem has optimal portfolio mix = 0:4545 1 5 For the given parametrization, c = 0:01125, = 0:0234375. Since both and 0 are greater than c, the roots of the algebraic equation corresponding to (6), which is equation (42) in Appendix A -and its equivalent for the broker -are imaginary. The transaction boundaries are real, since < :
Let us denote with an index p the corresponding partial-equilibrium solutions. Keeping costs at the level provided in general equilibrium, for the sake of comparison, barriers become equal to 16 l p = 0:1495 < < u p = 0:8243:
while the discount rate p becomes 0:0192.
Bid-ask spread
Let us comment on the equilibrium bid/ask spread …rst. The equilibrium bid price is approximately equal to s = 97:5% of the pre-bid quote, the ask price is equal to 1=q = 1=68:4% = 146% of it. The bid-ask spread -or round-trip cost -amounts to 1=q s = 48:5%. With a unique broker and no outsideoption, a tiny di¤erence in risk aversion (3.75%) justi…es huge costs and a huge spread in equilibrium. The latter is one order of magnitude bigger than the risk aversion (percentage) di¤ erence. This seems to be a very high number, but …nds a justi…cation in the facts mentioned at the beginning of section 5. The bid-ask spread is not calibrated to empirically observed values. By using the parameters of the previous transaction-cost, partial-equilibrium literature, we simply aim at stressing how important a subtle di¤erence in risk aversion of market participants can be in terms of price of immediacy. It is very likely to be a¤ected also by the monopoly power of the broker. For this reason, in a later section we weaken his position by introducing outside options. We consider the monopolistic case worth analyzing, because of the sensitivities and asymmetries it unveals, more than because of the absolute level of spreads it entails.
No-trade region
Let us see the e¤ects on the no-trade region. If costs are kept the same between the general and partial equilibrium (in the former being endogenous), we …nd that the intervention barriers are further apart in the partial-equilibrium than in the equilibrium case:
and the no-transaction cone in partial equilibrium incorporates the general equilibrium one:
This means that partial-equilibrium models are likely to have overstated the magnitude of no trade, even though they perfectly captured the trading mechanism. In a general-equilbrium perspective, the investor is less reluctant to trade, since the specialist has forecasted his customer's reaction when …xing the costs. In terms of optimal overall portfolio mix, as measured by the ratio of risky to total assets, y=(x + y), the equilibrium values are
while the partial-equilibrium ones are
The no-cost optimal mix would be 1 + = 0:31
As expected, even in terms of overall portfolio mix, the barriers are closer to the no-cost situation in the general-equilibrium case. Both in terms of risky to riskless ratio and overall portfolio mix, the percentage di¤erences between the general and partial equilibrium situation are one order of magnitude bigger than the risk-aversion di¤ erence which justi…es them.
Bias towards cash
The barriers of intervention of the investor are less symmetric with respect to the optimal ratio in the absence of costs, i.e. = 0:45, than without an intermediary, i.e. in partial equilibrium. This results from the comparison of the barriers l = 0:15; u = 0:03
or from the comparison of the optimal portfolio mix:
This permits us to comment on the bias towards cash -the riskless asset -which Constantinides found in the partial equilibrium model with consumption. There it was justi…ed by consumption itself, since it vanished with interim consumption, unless the horizon were …nite (Liu and Loewenstein (2002) ). In our case the bias comes back, even without interim consumption, since the equilibrium magnitude of costs is not symmetric: ask spreads 1=q 1 are much bigger than bid ones 1 s. We are going to argue below that investors would command a liquidity premium to switch from an hypothetical market without costs -hypothetical because it would have no trade -to an equilibrium with costs. The presence of a bias towards cash suggests that this liquidity premium should be particularly high.
Trade frequency
The spread and no-trade region features produce trade frequencies which -all others equal -are more realistic than partial equilibrium frequencies. Partial equilibrium models were overestimating the reduction in trade provided by transaction costs. Still, trade is far from being continuous. The frequency of trade can be measured by the expected time that the process takes in order to reach either the upper u or the lower barrier l, starting from the optimal mix . Between l and u, has drift = r and di¤usion . Standard results in the theory of the …rst passage time of a Brownian motion through either an upper or a lower boundary tell us that the expected time we are searching for is
In the cum-specialist equilibrium just described, the expected time between transactions is close to 6 months:
A tiny di¤erence in risk aversion of the participants then makes trade infrequent. The expected time would be t ' 13 years in the corresponding partial-equilibrium case, since the barriers are more distant from the Merton's line. Partial equilibrium models, all others equal, were overestimating the impact not only on the no-trade region, but also on trade infrequency. The expected time between interventions we obtain is huge in comparison with the continuous trading of the frictionless literature, but more realistic than the partial equilibrium one. This is in line with what Constantinides aimed at showing, early in the development of the transaction-cost literature, as well as with empirical evidence, largely interpreted, where trading is never a continuum.
Let us compare with the trading frequency obtained in the competitiveequilibrium models of Buss and Dumas (2012) and Lo et al. (2004) , in which agents split exogenous trading costs. With a similar assumption on the agents' endowment (in…nite variation), similar values for the fundamental value of the risky asset (instantaneous return and di¤usion) and a much bigger di¤erence in the agents'risk aversion, Buss and Dumas get a mean waiting time between successive transactions which goes up to two years, when the round-trip transaction cost is 20%. They have a trade frequency similar to our with smaller costs, then. Since in their model there is no intermediary extracting a rent from investors, this says that similar trade infrequencies are consistent with di¤er-ent market organizations. In a competitive market, it is achieved by investors further apart in risk aversion, with smaller -but exogenous -costs. Here it is achieved with smaller risk aversion di¤erence and higher costs (due to the rent). Lo et al. have an high frequency motive for trade and …xed costs. So, their trade should be boosted by the …rst motive, kept low by the second. As a result, they have calibrated examples in which -for volatility levels comparable to our choices -the expected time between transactions is close to our. We interpret this result as showing that, as in Buss and Dumas'case, di¤erent market settings can provide the same optimal trading frequency. In Lo et al., the trading frequency can reach years, when …xed costs increase. In our case such a high trading frequency would require a much higher di¤erence in risk aversion (see below).
Last, we can compare with partial-equilibrium models with transaction costs and a …nite horizon. Our results are in line with the assertion of Liu and Loewenstein (2002) , who note that "even small transaction costs lead to dramatic changes in the optimal behavior for an investor: from continuous trading to virtually buy-and-hold strategies. They are less extreme, since in their case costs ranging from 3 to 16%, i.e. in the order of magnitude of s above, together with the same expected return and volatility and similar risk aversion, led to expected transaction times of around 10 to 20 years. The di¤erence is due to the …nite horizon, which -all others equal -makes more unlikely that costs can be recouped. As a consequence, the frequency of trade drops even more dramatically than in an in…nite-horizon case, where transaction costs can be compensated by the excess return on risky securities. As soon as transaction costs are not in…nitesimal, the …nite and in…nite-time expected transaction frequencies are quite signi…cantly di¤erent. In order to achieve a buy and hold strategy in the present setting, while keeping all the other parameters …xed, we should consider a market maker with lower risk aversion, i.e. risk aversion much further from the investor's one. We will indeed see below that, when his risk aversion lowers, and gets further from his counterpart's one, the investor's trade frequency decreases.
Welfare implications
We still need to verify that at least in the base-case welfare -which here is measured by the rate of growth of expected utility -moves in the right direction when going from a non-intermediated market to an intermediated one. To do so, let us comment on the last couple of equilibrium parameters, namely and 0 . They indeed determine the rate of growth of the indirect utility of the investor and broker, and 0 respectively 17 . Given that = r , the higher is ; the smaller the rate of growth of the corresponding agent. Analogously for 0 : Since = 2:34% > p = 1:92%; the investor's rate of growth of expected utility in the current equilibrium, , is smaller than in the corresponding partial equilibrium. The presence of a (monopolistic) market maker a¤ects this rate in the expected direction.
Starting from this, we could determine the liquidity discount that investors would tolerate, costs being equal, in order to go from a general to a partial equilibrium. This means to determine under which r investors see their welfare growth una¤ected by the strategic specialist's intervention. Practically, it means to solve for r the investor's problem with p = 2:34%. We could also determine which liquidity premium investors would command in order to keep their welfare una¤ected when going from a no-cost equilibrium to an intermediated one. This computation, which would parallel the exam done for partial equilibrium by Constantinides (1986) , has the disadvantage that -as we know -the no-cost equilibrium is made by homogenous agents and has no trade. In the base-case studied so far, it would consist in solving for r the investor's and specialist's problems. In doing that, it would be necessary to keep the rate of growth of derived utility of the investor at the level it has in the absence of costs, while the broker's rate should be kept …xed at the equilibrium-with-costs level, 0 = 2:34%. It has been shown by Constantinides (1986) that the liquidity premium has a second order e¤ect on asset prices, in the sense that the ratio of the liquidity premium -as de…ned above -to percentage transaction costs is smaller than one; Jang, Koo, Liu and Loewenstein (2007) showed that -if returns are not IIDits e¤ect is of the …rst order, since the ratio is above one. Both papers drew the conclusion in partial equilibrium. Buss and Dumas (2012) explore the issue in a competitive, general equilibrium whose assumptions are similar to our, apart from the fact that -since there is perfect competition -there is no endogenous price for immediacy. Only exogenous trading costs exist. The liquidity premium they …nd -after having solved for the pricing kernel -is one order of magnitude smaller than the trading costs, but increasing (and concave) in them. One can conclude from their CAPM that transaction costs are likely to contribute to the explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more so the higher are transaction costs. Since our costs for immediacy are ten times bigger than Buss and Dumas' trading costs, the possibility of having both intermediated and competitive trade could probably raise the liquidity premium so as to push the equity premium in the right direction.
Sensitivity analysis
This section explores the spread, trade and welfare implications of changing the participants' risk aversion. By decreasing the risk aversion of the broker, or making it further from the investor's one, we …nd equilibria characterized by lower s and q, which means that bid prices decrease, ask prices and the overall spread and transaction costs increase. Table 1 below gives a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium bid prices, q values, control or no-trade limits, expected time between interventions and growth rates as a function of the broker's risk aversion 18 . Both s and q decrease, at a similar rate. This has an asymmetric impact on trading prices, since the bid price goes down from 97:5% to 84%, while the ask one increases from 1=68:4% = 146% to 1=56% = 178%. The absolute di¤erence is approximately 13 percentage points in the …rst case, 32 in the second. The behavior of costs with respect to the di¤erence in risk aversion is apparently counter intuitive. The more distant agents are in risk aversion, i.e. the better risk sharing should work, the higher is the spread. However, we will show in a few lines that the results on barriers, trade frequency and -consequently -the derived utility growth will reconcile this fact with intuition. Welfare -resulting from spreads and optimal trade -moves as risk-sharing commands, even though spreads do not seem to move in the intuitive direction.
Compare now with the microstructure, inventory-based models, such as Ho and Stoll (1981) . In most of these models the ask price increases and the bid one decreases with the intermediary's risk aversion. Table 1 shows that in our case the opposite holds: as risk aversion increases, 1=q decreases while s increases. This happens exclusively because the di¤ erence in risk aversion between the two counterparts matters. In our model the ask price 1=q decreases and the bid one s increases -thus reducing the bid-ask spread -as the broker's risk aversion goes up and the investor's one remains …xed, i.e. when the di¤erence between their risk aversions goes down (from :4 to :15 in Table 1 ).
As for trading barriers, since lower risk aversion for the broker entails increases in transaction costs, the lower barrier l decreases, while the upper one u goes up. In the plane x y, the cone of no-transactions, characterized by l < < u, becomes wider. Investors become more tolerant with respect to discrepancies between their actual asset mix and the optimal, Merton's one, : In partial equilibrium, this happens as a result of an increase in the investor's risk aversion (see for instance Constantinides (1986) ). Here, even if the investor's attitude towards risk does not change, his counterpart's decreased risk aversion makes him more reluctant to trade, since his costs in doing so increase. Figure  3 shows the behavior of the barriers as a function of the di¤erence between the specialist and investor's risk aversion [insert here …gure 3] By putting together the behavior of the bid-ask spread and the barriers, and recalling that barriers correspond to inventories in the microstructure literature, we observe that not only both the bid and the ask price separately depend on inventories, as was clear from the equilibrium de…nition, but also the bid-ask spread does. Indeed, going down Table 1 , the spread changes and the barriers do. In traditional microstructure models, inventories disappear as determinants of the spread, while being determinants of its components, the bid and ask prices, because of symmetry and linearity assumptions in the demand by investors. O'Hara (1997) already anticipated that independence of the spread from the level of inventories was not very intuitive, and could probably be overcome by relaxing the traditional assumption of a constant fundamental -or pre-spread -value for the underlying good 19 . Our model has no symmetry and linearity assumptions on demand, which is endogenized. More than that, and consistently with O'Hara's intuition, our equilibrium builds on a non-constant fundamental value. Table 1 shows that the bid price s is countermonotonic with respect to the upper trading barrier u: the higher is the broker inventory, the lower is his bid price. The ask price 1=q is countermonotonic in the lower barrier l: the higher is the broker inventory, the lower is his ask price. The bid-ask spread 1=q s almost doubles when going from top to bottom in the Table, as O'Hara's suggestion commands. Figure 3 reports the optimal holdings without transaction costs too. By so doing, it puts into evidence the asymmetry, or bias toward cash, when transaction costs increase. Going down the Table, the lower barrier l departs from the optimal ratio without transaction costs, = 0:454 5, more than the upper one u: the cone opens up more towards the lower part and people tend to hold more cash than if the barriers opened in a symmetric way. This e¤ect, which we noticed for the base-case, is preserved when costs increase because risk aversions depart. It is due to the interaction of broker and investor, which makes costs on the ask side increase more than costs on the bid side. It is the e¤ect on trade of the greater sensitivity of ask with respect to bid prices. It follows from the sensitivity of s and q with respect to the di¤erence in risk aversions, visualized in Figure 2 .
The frequency of trade adjusts according to the barriers' movement: the expected time to the …rst intervention t goes up from 6 months to 3 years when risk aversion of the broker decreases. So, in order to obtain a trade frequency of the order of decades we would probably need a very high di¤erence in risk aversion.
The rates of growth of indirect utility move too: slightly decreases, while 0 increases when risk aversion of the broker decreases (or the two get further apart). This means that = r slightly increases. The adjustment of tradei.e., the opening up of the no-transaction region between l and u -is so large as to make the whole rate of growth of utility go up, even if transaction costs increase.
Not only intervention is rare in time, but such policy is so e¤ective that it may make the whole rate of growth of utility increase even when transaction costs go up 20 . The less a broker is risk averse, i.e. the further in risk aversion he is from his customer, the less his prices will be advantageous for the latter. However, the latter decreases trade so much that his utility's growth rate increases. So, an increase in risk sharing possibilities -because the two market participants are further apart in risk aversion -does not show up in the bid-ask spread. It shows up, as it should, in the welfare of investors.
Equilibrium with physical costs
We now focus on an equilibrium in which the specialist imposes the bid-ask spread represented by s; q to his counterpart, but su¤ers external or physical costs of trading, which he does not pocket. This increases his cash out ‡ow for each unit of risky asset bought from s to s 0 > s, while -for any unit of cash in ‡ow -it modi…es the value of the risky-asset sale to q 0 > q: Trading costs are exogenous, as in Lo et al. (2004) or Buss and Dumas (2012) ; without loss of generality, we assume that the ratio s 0 =s; q 0 =q is equal to k > 1.
Model update
Trading costs can be modelled by keeping s and q in the investor's SDEs (2) and inserting s 0 > s; q 0 > q in the specialist's ones (5). The broker's …nal wealth becomes
It is easy to show that, in order to …nd an equilibrium with exogenous trading costs on top of endogenous bid-ask spreads, one needs to solve for ; 0 ; s; q the following equations:
2 0 The opposite could happen for the broker: when his risk aversion decreases, 0 could decreases. This would mean that, in spite of applying higher costs, he su¤ers in terms of utility growth, because investors do not visit him very often. Since r is not speci…ed, though, we do not know whether the broker's utility does cumulate at a higher or lower rate 0 . It is interesting to notice that the two rates tend to coincide when risk aversions do (i.e., when 1 0 ! 4);as one expects. Recall though that when the spread disappears equilibrium vanishes (since 6 = 1).
where we have de…ned
Numerical results
Using the same asset parameters as in the base-case, namely r = 5%; 2 = 4%, and keeping the investor's risk aversion at 1 = 4, as in that case, we explored the equilibrium for a number of possible impacts of external costs k and broker's risk aversion 1 0 . Knowing that -without external costs -equilibria with moderate bid-ask spread exist when the risk aversions of the two agents are closer -the investor's one being still bigger than his broker's -we explore here the case in which the two di¤er by 1%, i.e. 1 0 = 3:96. As soon as the risk aversion di¤erence is such as to produce moderate transaction costs in the absence of external costs (as it happens when 0 ! ), we have equilibria also with very high external costs. All others equal, we considered several levels of external costs k. In table 2 we present three of them, for k between 22% (bottom) and 29% (top). We …nd that s goes from 99:5 to 98:2%, q from 65:5 to 60%. These equilibria provide us with new information. They are able to tell us that the price of immediacy -and the width of the no-trade cone -grows when the intermediary su¤ers external costs -as expected -and how it does. First, the bid-ask spread is monotonic in the magnitude of external costs, as expected. In the range examined, the bid-ask spread goes from 69% (top) to 53% (bottom). It is much greater than it is without costs: in Table 1 , the spread was already 49% with a risk aversion of 3.85 on the part of the broker, while here it is 53% at the minimum, even though the risk aversions are much closer. Second, also the cone opens up in a monotonic way. The lower trading barrier increases, the upper one decreases from top to bottom. Third, the increase is not so much pronounced: even though physical costs range from 22 to 29% of s or q, the bidask spread and the barriers are not so far from what they were for pure rent. The spread -as well as the cone -seems to be mostly justi…ed by the market structure, not by physical costs. Fourth, the increase in the spread and the opening of the no-trade region are almost symmetric for sales and purchases. From top to bottom, the lower barrier goes from 0.2346 to 0.2688, while the upper one ranges from 0.5318 to 0.5043, so the di¤erence is more or less 0.03 in the …rst and 0.04 in the second case. Even though the barriers do not have the same sensitive with respect to physical costs, since the absolute change in the lower barrier is more or less the double than the change in the upper one, that di¤erence in sensitivity remains the same when the level of physical costs changes. There is no asymmetry or bias towards cash generated by an increase in costs. Only the initial distance from the optimal ratio (and its sensitivity) is bigger for the lower than for the upper barrier.
The expected time to trade after a re-adjustment increases with respect to the no-cost case, as expected from the spread behavior. Reading now from bottom to top, it ranges from 1.21 to 2.23 years. When costs go up, trade becomes more infrequent. As a result, the investor's goes slightly down, his welfare slightly increases. So, as in the case without costs, the trading policy is so e¤ective that it counterbalances the specialist's pricing policy.
Overall, Table 2 provides further ground for the comparisons with the models of Buss and Dumas or Lo et al. which we conducted in the previous section. In our case, including or not physical costs -which are the only ones in the related literature -does not move very much the numerical results and does not change the symmetries or asymmetries, including the bias toward cash and the e¤ectiveness of the trading policy in terms of welfare.
The presence of spreads comonotonic with external trading costs permits to compare with the models of decentralized trading with endogenous spreads mentioned in the introduction, i.e. Du¢ e et al. (2005) . Even though they have asymmetric information and outside options, which are respectively ruled out and do not make sense in our model, Du¢ e et al. (2005) show that bid-ask spreads are lower if the chance to meet and trade with another agent is easier. In their setting, this typically happens for "big"traders, who are able to contact more counterparts. Such result makes their contribution profoundly di¤erent from the traditional information-based literature, which assigns greater spreads to more informed -intuitively, "bigger" -investors. In our setting, Du¢ e's et al. results can be reproduced by comparing markets with di¤erent trading costs. Our cross-market predictions then are similar to their, i.e. give lower spreads when the access to counterparts is easier, for instance because they are "big". In this sense, our cum-broker equilibrium provides an extremely stylized description of OTC markets, certainly poorer than the Du¢ e et al. one, but with an explicit, motivating role for risk aversion 21 . In addition, since trade frequency is endogenous in our setting, the traders which deserve smaller spreads are the ones which intervene more frequently. This is consistent with them being "big" traders.
7 Equilibrium with outside option
Model
In this section we give investors the outside option to wait and trade in a competitive market, instead of trading with the intermediary. This should enable us to understand how much "competition"is likely to a¤ect equilibrium bid-ask spreads. In order to model the outside option, we assume that over the next instant the market can still be an intermediated one, or investors can …nd themselves in a state where they can trade competitively at no cost. To keep the model simple, we indeed disregard physical trading costs.
We investigate a continuous two-state Markov-regime model, meant to formalize the idea that investors can either trade in the intermediated market or wait until a counterpart in the decentralized market arrives and trade with them. In the …rst regime or state s 1 the investor can trade only with the specialist and undergoes transaction costs 1 s,1=q 1. In the second regime or state s 2 he can match his trade with other investors and transact without costs. The switching among the two states X t = s 1 ; s 2 is governed by a Markov transition matrix Q where the entries Q i;j , i; j 2 1; 2 are de…ned as
We specify Q so that Q i;i = Q i;j , i 6 = j :
1 2 > 0: This means that conditional on being in state s 1 , s 2 at time t, the regime process is Poisson with instantaneous switching intensity 1 , 2 . The transition probability from one state to the other is
where ij is the Kronecker delta. The stationary distribution, i.e. the long run proportion the process spends in states s 1 and s 2 for t ! 1 is = ( 2 ; 1 ).
The investor problem
The maximization problem for the investor becomes a system in the two value functions J i1 , J i2 -which apply respectively when starting from state s 1 and s 2 -which can be written and solved as in Dimitrakas (2008) :
Assume that 22 J i1 = (x+y) and J i2 = x K(y=x) by homotheticity; transform the variables as follows:
= y=x, y = =(1 + )W , x = 1=(1 + )W and substitute. From (24) we get the value of K as the solution of the corresponding homogeneous equation plus a particular solution 23 K p of the complete equation:
Here A; B are two constants, 1 ; 2 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial of the second degree equation:
and = r as in the previous sections. In the no-cost state the investor should keep his portfolio at the optimum ratio dictated by the Merton's solution. Substituting K in the …rst equation and writing down the …rst order condition for the max with respect to , we get the following two equations:
By value-matching and smooth-pasting, the boundary conditions at lower and upper levels = l; u of the no-transaction zone are:
Hence, the investor's problem is solved when eq. (26)- (31) are satis…ed with K given by (25).
The specialist problem
Also for the specialist there are two di¤erent value functions, depending on the state he starts from. Since the specialist does not transact in state s 1 , there is 2 2 Notice that J i 1 is homogeneous of degree and at the optimum J
no optimization in state s 1 and he can optimize only in state s 2 . The two value functions J s1 ,J s2 are de…ned as:
The system of equations which characterize these value functions can be written as:
and is subject to the same BCs of the single-state case, i.e. (20) and (21). The …rst equation is the discounted Feynman-Kac equation -since no optimization occurs in state s 1 -while the second one is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation valid under optimality. The costs, s; q are determined through the specialist optimization with (20) and (21). The optimization conditions for the specialist can no longer be solved explicitly, and the derivatives of l; u with respect to the costs s, q must be computed numerically. To solve the system, it is still possible to write J s1;2 = x I s1;2 ( s ) and transform the system itself into two di¤erential equations in I s1;2 ( s ).
The system ( 
where c i ; i = 1; ::4 are constant,
Hence, the specialist's problem is solved by (36), provided that the constant 0 solves (18) and s, q satisfy (20), (21). There are three relevant intervals for 0 : In one of them the solutions for x 1;2;3;4 , are all reals; in a second there are two reals and two imaginary solutions. In the third the solutions are all imaginary. We report here the form of the value function in the last interval, since this is 26 the case which occurs in our numerical experiments below. With all imaginary solutions for x i , the value function I s2 can be written as:
We set A 0 = B 0 = C 0 = D 0 = 1 to avoid extra degrees of freedom. I s1 can be found by substituting I s2 in the second equation of (36).
Equilibrium
In order to …nd a solution, we need to solve for the nine unknowns , 0 , s, q, l, u, A, B, m the system of 9 equations (18, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) . This is the specialist-investor equilibrium when investors have the outside option to wait and trade without costs.
Numerical results
The numerical method to solve the system is illustrated in Appendix C.
Base-case
We explore solutions for the parametric base-case above, namely = 4, r = 5%, 2 = 4%; 0 = 3:85. We take as switching parameters 1 = 0:8, 2 = 0:2, which implies a stationary distribution = (0:2; 0:8). The parameters 1 ; 2 are therefore chosen so that the system spends 1=4 of time in the costless state when t ! 1. We get ; 0 ; s; q = (0:0355; 1:1352; 89:17%; 90%);
with barriers equal to l = 0:1448 < < u = 1:2337:
In order to illustrate the di¤erences with respect to the single-state, or nooutside-option case, let us recall that there the main endogenous quantities were ; 0 ; s; q = (0:023428; 0:023687; 97:53%; 68:41%);
As expected from the elimination of the "monopolistic"position of the specialist, the welfare of the specialist decreases with respect to the single-state case. His 0 goes from 2.3% to 113%, which means that the rate of growth of his derived utility is drastically reduced. The welfare of the investor does not improve: his moves in the same direction as the specialist's one. However, the change is much smaller, from 2.3% to 3.5%. This happens because there are states in which he does not pay the price of immediacy, but he looses the intermediary's service of immediacy too. The slight change in his welfare signals that the two e¤ects are almost comparable.
Since s is lower and q is higher in the new equilibrium, the overall transaction costs go down. Transaction costs at the upper barrier go from 1 s = 2:5% to 10.83% , while those at the lower barrier go from 1=q 1 = 46:2% to 11.11% . So, overall transaction costs 1=q s go from 48.7% to 21.29%. Not only overall costs go down, but they are more symmetric at the two barriers, since upper costs increase little, lower costs dramatically decrease.
As for the intervention barriers, they widen, as intuition would suggest. The investor is more tolerant with respect to current discrepancies from the Merton's ratio, since he has a chance of being able to transact without costs in the future. The boundaries still contain the Merton's ratio, where the investor optimally sets his portfolio when no costs exist.
We can compare with the single-state base-case also the other relevant feature of the equilibrium, namely trade frequency. The …rst time to trade requires a more sophisticated computation than in the single-state case, since trade can occur in both states. Aa a preliminary result useful just for the sake of comparison, we compute the …rst time-to-trade conditionally on remaining in the cost case (as if there were no other state, which is evidently a very rough upper bound). This time, which was 0.5 before, raises up to almost 23 years.
Sensitivity analysis
Let us now vary the risk aversion of the specialist, in order to see how much this a¤ects this "non-monopolistic" equilibrium and its comparison with the "monopolistic" case. In Table 3 below we report the equilibria parameters for the two cases -labeled respectively as "non-mon" and "mon" -when the specialist's risk aversion gets further from the investor's one. For the monpolistic case we report the …gures down to 1 0 = 3:6, while for the non-monopolistic case we go even further, to 1 0 = 3, where the monopolistic equilibrium would give very high transaction costs. The non transaction cone l u is larger and the expected …rst trade time is higher in the non-monopolistic case. The e¤ect on costs is sizable and welfare of the intermediary is drastically reduced. However, investors adjusts the barriers -and the time to trade -so that the e¤ect on their welfare is almost none.
Summary and conclusions
We characterized equilibrium bid-ask spreads and infrequent trade in symmetricinformation, intermediated markets. We actually speci…ed two cases: either investors are obliged to trade with the specialist and incur into transaction costs, comprehensive of physical costs, or they can wait until another trader -with whom they can trade at no cost -arrives. In each economy, we provided the optimality conditions for market participants. These conditions determine the equilibrium bid and ask spreads, as well as the value functions of the agents and intervention barriers -or trade -of the investor.
We studied …rst the equilibrium in which trade occurs with the specialist only. In equilibrium, trade is the local time of the Brownian motion at appropriate levels, namely the trading barriers of the investor. We proved numerically that the equilibrium exists, at least for some combinations of risk aversion of its participants, and that its bid-ask spreads and trade frequency increase with the di¤erence in risk aversions of the specialist and investor. The analysis was conducted both in the absence and in the presence of external trading costs.We then extended the analysis to the case in which investors can also wait and transact without paying the costs.
Our major contribution consists in endogenizing spreads and infrequent trade. With no outside option, e¤ects on spreads are one order of magnitude bigger than their causes. Both with and without trading costs, intermediation imposes a price for immediacy which is very high in comparison to its motivation, i.e. di¤erence in risk aversion, and very sensitive to changes in risk attitudes. Also the departure of the barriers from the optimal portfolio mix in the absence of costs is one order of magnitude bigger than the di¤erence in risk aversion between market participants. Trade is infrequent, less than assumed by partial equilibrium models, but so as to wash away the continuous readjustments we often assume in continuous-time Finance. A small heterogeneity in risk aversion, together with a monopolistic position of the specialist, is able to produce high spreads and trade frequency of the order of months. The result is encouraging, given the low level of risk-aversion heterogeneity observed in recent empirical work. It may also be considered too strong, since our spreads are high with respect to "observed" levels. In order to address this issue, we studied also the equilibrium in which investors have the outside-option to wait and trade competitively. As expected, this option reduces the magnitude of the bid-ask spreads, without wiping infrequent trade out. The e¤ect on costs is strong and welfare of the intermediary is drastically reduced. Investors however adjusts the barriers so that the e¤ect on their welfare -which in principle could be negatively a¤ected too, since either they trade through the intermediary and pay his rent, or must wait until a counterpart comes -is almost null.
Starting from exogenous costs -instead of endogenous spreads -Lo et al. had already noticed the strong e¤ect of costly trading on prices, and made it a sign of distinction of their theoretical contribution with respect to the previous literature. Since they were not working in an intermediated market, they explained the strong impact of trading costs on prices via high-frequency trading needs and …xed costs. Maintaining the hypothesis of highly frequent tradingneeds, we explained …rst-order e¤ects on prices and trade through the existence of an intermediated market with its price for immediacy.
Appendix A
The three steps for solving the optimization problem of the investor are as follows. First, we recognize that a candidate solution for the value function is either
where A; B R; si and co are the trigonometric sine and cosine, or
where A; B R; x 1;2 = m . The type of solution depends on whether, having de…ned c.
we have > (<) c : Indeed, the algebraic equation corresponding to (6), which provides the roots x 1;2 , i.e.
has imaginary solutions in the …rst case, real in the second. Second, we substitute both the …rst and second order BCs into the ODE, so as to obtain a second degree equation for the optimal barriers l and u, through their transforms " l and " u . These are respectively the smaller and the bigger root of the following equation:
whose discriminant we denote as :
Third, we make the determinant of the value-matching BCs, once written in terms of (39) or (40), and considered as equations in (A; B) or (A; B), equal to zero. This guarantees that the value function is non-null and stationary. The determinant is equated to zero by a proper choice of the arti…cial discount rate , via . This means solving for the algebraic equation a(l; q)b(u; s) c(u; s)d(l; q) = 0
whose entries are de…ned as in the text for the imaginary case. Analogous expressions hold for the real case. The solution requires substitution of the expressions for l; u; l ; u in terms of the parameters r; and itself.
Appendix B
In order to compute the derivatives in (19), we …rst use the de…nition of " l and " u , namely (7) and (8), we can determine explicitly the investor's barriers: 
Based on them, dependence of l on q and u on s acts both directly and via the discount rate (which equates the determinant of the value-matching conditions to zero, and therefore depends on all the model's variables, including q and s)
Using the implicit function theorem to derive the discount rate sensitivities, 
which need to be substituted in the "modi…ed" smooth pasting conditions as well as in conditions (20) and (21). The latter enter into the equilibrium computation.
Appendix C
The system of 9 equations (18, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) results to be time consuming to be solved in one step, especially in computing the numeric derivatives in (20), (21). We noticed that the investor and the specialist problems are coupled through s, q, l, u and the derivatives @l=@q, @u=@s. In particular, given s, q it is possible to solve the investor's problem (26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) . We solve the system in three steps. At the …rst step we solve the investor's problem computing l, u, @l=@q, @u=@s at every point on a grid of values of 0:75 < s; q < 1 with step 0.001. Even with a high number of points on the grid to be computed, this method allows us to solve a smaller problem and starting from chosen initial parameters. To initialize the parameter estimation, we …tted a linear relationship between s and u and between q and l. This allowed us to use the Quasi-Newton local search method. Moreover it permitted to compute the numerical derivatives only across the grid. The solution of the investor's problem is an array of four values l, u, @l=@q, @u=@s for every point on the grid. At the second step we …t four splines curves for each of these variables. At the third step we solve the investor's problem (18, 20, 21) utilizing the splines …tting in place of l, u, @l=@q, @u=@s. After …nding a solution, we re…ne and check the values of the solution solving the initial system of 9 equation all together, using as initial guess the solution found at step three.
Figure 1: No-transaction cone in the single-agent (l p; u p ) and monopolistic, general-equilibrium case (l; u). In both cases the optimal ratio of risky to riskless assets for the frinctionless market, , is included in the cone. The cone is in the plane of the asset values (x; y). . The cone is written in terms of the risky-to-riskless-asset ratio = y=x, which stays between l and u. As in …gure one, the cone contains the frictionless ratio in the monopolistic general-equilibrium. 
